The U.S.
Senate held a commission meeting on Friday to review the Afghanistan War, concentrating on the duration from 2001 to 2008.
Numerous high-ranking U.S.
policymakers, generals, and former Afghan officials went to the conference.
Crucial concerns relating to the early years of the U.S.
military presence in Afghanistan were addressed.Shamila Chaudhary, co-chair of the Afghanistan War Commission, said the conference concentrated on the early years of the U.S.
war in Afghanistan, specifically from 2001 to 2008.
Chaudhary stated: “& ldquo; In this century, we released 2 wars beyond our borders —-- in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These wars were discussed, justified, and criticized.
This session, and the more comprehensive objective of this commission, is not about evaluating the past.
It is about learning from it.
The war in Afghanistan has never ever had easy conclusions.
That doesn’& rsquo; t mean we ought to avoid attempting to understand it.
If we do not analyze what occurred in Afghanistan, we run the risk of turning the war into an abstract principle.”& rdquo; In the conference, General David Barno, former U.S.
commander in Afghanistan, indicated an absence of coordination and connection in U.S.
military management as reasons for the country’& rsquo; s failure in Afghanistan.
& ldquo; I want to highlight three essential factors that, in my view, weakened America’& rsquo; s chances of success in Afghanistan over two decades: initially, the relentless failure to successfully incorporate U.S.
political, military, diplomatic, and economic efforts.
Second, the fast turnover in U.S.
military and diplomatic management in Afghanistan over 20 years.
Third, the mishandling of external safe houses such as Pakistan,” & rdquo; said Barno.Andrew Natsios, former director of USAID, stated in his remarks that the U.S.
federal government’& rsquo; s goals in Afghanistan were never ever fixed up due to the fact that they were equally exclusive and contradictory.Natsios mentioned: “& ldquo; Policymakers in Washington presumed that by investing vast amounts of money, they might achieve excellent and favorable results in Afghanistan.
But gradually, it became clear that these decisions were misdirected and intensified the situation.
The U.S.
military and Afghan political leaders saw development just in construction tasks, whereas genuine development lay in structure and fortifying organizations.”& rdquo; Meanwhile, Shamila Chaudhary also highlighted the value of listening to the views of Afghanistan’& rsquo; s partners when resolving crucial questions about reconciliation with the Islamic Emirate and forming strategies on the Afghanistan issue.It is likewise notable that two previous officials of the previous Afghan government attended this conference and shared their point of views on the errors and failures of both the U.S.
and the former Afghan government.The post US Senate assembles commission to evaluate early years of Afghanistan war initially appeared on TINS News.