Washington&& s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F.

Sopko mentioned in a report launched Monday, that the agency found 6 short-term elements accelerated the collapse of the Afghan security forces in August 2021.

In his report to Congress, Sopko stated first the decision by the United States to withdraw all U.S.

military forces && basically altered the habits of the United States, the [Ashraf] Ghani administration, and the Taliban (IEA).&& He said many Afghans thought the U.S.-Taliban agreement was an act of bad faith and a signal that the && United States was handing over Afghanistan to the opponent as it rushed to leave the nation,& & he said adding that && its instant impact was a significant loss in ANDSF spirits&& .

In addition, the change in the U.S.

military & s level of assistance to the ANDSF; the failure to establish a self-sufficient ANDSF; previous President Ashraf Ghani&& s frequent changes of ANDSF leaders and consultation of loyalists; the Afghan government&& s failure to take responsibility for Afghan security through the application of a national security method; and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan&& s (IEA) effective exploitation of ANDSF weaknesses, were likewise behind the collapse of the security forces.&& These 6 short-term elements collaborated to trigger the ANDSF&& s collapse, & Sopko mentioned in the report.He said, in addition, SIGAR recognized eight systemic factors that describe why, after 20 years and nearly $90 billion in U.S. security support, the ANDSF was vulnerable to collapse in the very first place and ill prepared to sustain security following a U.S.

withdrawal.According to him, these factors were: The length of the U.S.

dedication was detached from a reasonable understanding of the time needed to construct a self-sustaining security sector; No one country or firm had ownership of the ANDSF advancement objective; Advisors were frequently poorly trained and unskilled for their objective, while regular workers rotations impeded standardization, connection of effort, and institutional memory; The lack of reliable interagency oversight and evaluation programs prevented a clear picture of truth on the ground; Afghan corruption wore down ANDSF abilities; U.S training, logistics and weapons procurement policies undermined its mentioned objective of producing a self-sufficient Afghan military; The United States perpetuated pre-existing ethnic and local stress instead of accomplishing mentioned objective objectives of force diversity and unification; The U.S.

and Afghan federal governments stopped working to develop a police efficient at providing justice and protecting Afghan people from crime.Sopko also mentioned that throughout SIGAR&& s work looking at the accounting for and status of U.S.-provided equipment to the ANDSF and U.S.trained ANDSF personnel, the company found that the United States did not have a complete accounting of equipment and personnel even before the collapse.He said the IEA is now using U.S.-provided military equipment in operations; and while some U.S.-provided airplane have been recuperated, others remain in limbo in other countries.In addition, ANDSF personnel have gotten away, are in hiding, have been killed, or may have signed up with extremist groups, Sopko stated.Sopko also specified in the report that the US department of defense and the state left declined to examine the interimDraft of the report and in turn rejected SIGAR access to their personnel, && and mainly declined to address requests for details&& .

& This limited SIGAR&& s ability to perform this assessment.

Still, this final variation includes extra information that we received from U.S.

and former Afghan officials over the previous eight months, without support from U.S.

companies.&& The post US and Ghani government ‘& lsquo; set the phase & for the collapse of republic: SIGAR first appeared on Ariana News.