INSUBCONTINENT EXCLUSIVE:
The initial report by the National Transportation Safety Board on the fatal self-driving Uber crash in March confirms that the car detected
the pedestrian as early as 6 seconds before the crash, but did not slow or stop because its emergency braking systems were deliberately
disabled.
Uber told the NTSB that &emergency braking maneuvers are not enabled while the vehicle is under computer control, to reduce the
potential for erratic vehicle behavior,& in other words, to ensure a smooth ride
&The vehicle operator is relied on to intervene and take action
The system is not designed to alert the operator.& It not clear why the emergency braking capability even exists if it is disabled while the
The Volvo model built-in safety systems — collision avoidance and emergency braking, among other things — are also disabled while in
autonomous mode.
It appears that in an emergency situation like this this &self-driving car& is no better, or substantially worse, than many
normal cars already on the road.
It hard to understand the logic of this decision
An emergency is exactly the situation when the self-driving car, and not the driver, should be taking action
Its long-range sensors can detect problems accurately from much farther away, while its 360-degree awareness and route planning allow it to
make safe maneuvers that a human would not be able to do in time
Humans, even when their full attention is on the road, are not the best at catching these things; relying only on them in the most dire
circumstances that require quick response times and precise maneuvering seems an incomprehensible and deeply irresponsible decision.
Here
how Uber self-driving cars are supposed to detect pedestrians
According to the NTSB report, the vehicle first registered Elaine Herzberg on
lidar six seconds before the crash — at the speed it was traveling, that puts first contact at about 378 feet away
She was first identified as an unknown object, then a vehicle, then a bicycle, over the next few seconds (it isn&t stated when these
classifications took place exactly).
The car following the collision
During these six seconds, the driver could and should have been
alerted of an anomalous object ahead on the left — whether it was a deer, a car or a bike, it was entering or could enter the road and
But the system did not warn the driver and apparently had no way to.
Then, 1.3 seconds before impact, which is to say about 80 feet away,
the Uber system decided that an emergency braking procedure would be necessary to avoid Herzberg
But it did not hit the brakes, as the emergency braking system had been disabled, nor did it warn the driver because, again, it couldn&t.
It
was only when, less than a second before impact, the driver happened to look up from whatever it was she was doing and saw Herzberg, whom
the car had known about in some way for five long seconds by then
It struck and killed her.
It reflects extremely poorly on Uber that it had disabled the car ability to respond in an emergency — though it
was authorized to speed at night — and no method for the system to alert the driver should it detect something important
This isn&t just a safety issue, like going on the road with a sub-par lidar system or without checking the headlights — it a failure of
judgement by Uber, and one that cost a person life.
Arizona, where the crash took place, barred Uber from further autonomous testing, and
Uber yesterday ended its program in the state.
Uber offered the following statement on the report:
Over the course of the last two months,
we&ve worked closely with the NTSB
As their investigation continues, we&ve initiated our own safety review of our self-driving vehicles program
We&ve also brought on former NTSB Chair Christopher Hart to advise us on our overall safety culture, and we look forward to sharing more on
the changes we&ll make in the coming weeks.
