INSUBCONTINENT EXCLUSIVE:
To many countries in Europe, the return of Donald Trump to the White House is seen as a momentous, almost apocalyptic, shift that is likely
to disrupt alliances and upend economic relations
Meanwhile, American adversaries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia anticipate that the incoming administration will mark an
opportunity to advance their anti-Western agendas
Yet there is another region of the world, one that includes many U.S
The region has long conducted relations with Washington on the basis of common interests rather than common values
the liberal international order
Indeed, much of Asia views the liberal order with ambivalence
West.For Asia, far more than a radical deviation from existing U.S
The United States is not in retreat and has not embraced isolation
Instead, it is expanding the geographic scope of the approach that U.S
and by becoming more circumspect about when and how it gets involved internationally
Having dealt with such a United States for almost half a century, Asia is not unduly agitated about a second Trump administration
This is not to discount important concerns in the region, including about tariff policies and Taiwan
allies, partners, and friends in the region
Rather than getting dragged into other Asian quagmires, Washington would maintain stability as an offshore balancer, without deploying
This meant that the United States would provide a nuclear umbrella of extended deterrence, as well as a military presence centered on air
No longer could they count on Washington to directly intervene as it did in Vietnam.That approach has mostly characterized U.S
policy in Asia ever since
foreign policy see a quasi-imperialist, trigger-happy hegemon, Asian observers tend to see a fundamentally cautious power that is reluctant
to deploy military power and that will calculate its own interests carefully before acting
The United States is vital for maintaining stability, but Asian countries do not consider it completely reliable because, as an offshore
balancer, its decisions will always cause the region to doubt its intentions: if Washington decides to get involved, Asian leaders may worry
they will be pulled into larger geopolitical struggles; if it decides not to, they may fear abandonment.Since the early years of this
century, the United States has begun to apply this approach to other regions, as well
President Joe Biden was able to cut the Gordian knot when he ordered the U.S
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021
but committed no American forces on the ground
Of course, Joe Biden has been more consultative as president than Trump ever was or will likely be, and he has taken steps to strengthen U.S
alliances in Asia through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, and the AUKUS defense agreement with Australia and the United
approach to foreign policy because the region has already dealt with the United States in this way
Indeed, the distinction between offshore balancing and naked transactionalism is one of degree rather than kind
Trump will be less consultative, more unpredictable, less generous in providing assistance, and will demand that allies and partners pay
more for American protection, but the result may not be so very different
There is only one United States, and it will remain vital for maintaining stability regardless of who occupies the White House
Most Asian countries will therefore accept what is possible under the incoming administration, particularly since they did not regard the
pre-Trump United States with unqualified confidence
Nor did they experience the first Trump administration as all bad.Consider the differences toward the region between Trump and his immediate
him as weak when it came to confronting American adversaries, particularly China
partners across the region took note
On the other hand, in 2017, many Asian leaders quietly cheered when, at their first summit, Trump told Xi during dinner that he had ordered
a cruise missile attack on Syria that night after the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad had used chemical weapons
his first term suggest that his emphasis on peace through strength aligns with the instincts of many Asian governments
The issues that could lead to conflict in the region have no definitive solutions, but they need to be managed through firm deterrence and
In doing so, Trump restored the deterrence that had been lost during the Obama administration, when Washington let the North Korean
Ultimately, that summit, and a subsequent meeting in Vietnam, did not lead to a breakthrough because Trump lacked the patience to persevere
with his own strategy and failed to set realistic goals
The Trump administration was mistaken to think that North Korea would ever give up its nuclear weapons, but it was not wrong to try to
manage the threat through deterrence and diplomacy
The firmness was there, but not the adroitness.Viewing the president-elect from this perspective, leaders in East Asia and Southeast Asia
have no strong reason to fear Trump 2.0
policy toward the region are already in place, some of them with strong bipartisan support as the Biden administration extended and expanded
the approach of the first Trump administration on priority issues such as dealing with China
Any new policies in these areas are unlikely to be fundamental shifts of direction
Three issues in particular bear close monitoring: Taiwan, tariffs, and regional leadership.The Taiwan conundrumBreaking with the United
Trump will not repeat such statements
said, is a long way away from the United States and difficult to defend and should pay more for U.S
The danger is that he may come to see Taiwan as a mere pawn in a larger game with China
Trump will certainly want to cut trade deals with Beijing using tariffs and the threat of a trade war as leverage
This could be extremely disruptive
But the dangers and uncertainties will multiply exponentially if he mixes trade and security by throwing Taiwan into any possible deal.Trump
How he tries to do so will be closely watched throughout Asia, and particularly in China
Nevertheless, it is important not to draw a straight line from how Trump treats Ukraine to what Beijing may conclude about how he will treat
The geopolitical circumstances of Ukraine and Taiwan are not identical, as China itself has pointed out
venture against it would shake the foundations of party rule
corruption scandals at the top of the Chinese military have cast doubts on its competence and capabilities
in the indispensable role of its chip industry, particularly the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
The fact that it can produce chips better than any other company does not mean that no one else can produce them
In any case, TSMC has been shifting some of its activities from Taiwan to the United States and Japan and may also explore relocating some
parts of its operations to India, Europe, and Southeast Asia
manufacturing capabilities, it would signal to Taipei that it cannot count on unlimited support from Washington
Such steps could prevent Taiwanese domestic politics from drifting in a potentially destabilizing direction, perhaps by taking a more
overtly pro-independence stance that would force Beijing to react by stepping up military exercises around Taiwan or moving against the
South China Sea island of Taiping, which is occupied and administered by Taiwan.The effect of the war in Ukraine on other countries in Asia
Australia, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have taken strong and clear positions of principle against Russian aggression in Ukraine
But most of the region is ambivalent
to U.S.-initiated or -supported wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon, among other conflicts
Many Asian states will also seek to protect their national interests by calculating costs and benefits
and Ukraine remaining second-order considerations
Of far greater concern is China
That issue alone has driven even traditionally nonaligned countries such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam to move closer to Washington, a
trend that began during the first Trump administration and grew under Biden.Looking for a leaderFor many Asian countries, trade policy is
trade hawks, such as Jamison Greer, whom Trump has nominated as U.S
trade representative, are given major roles in U.S
Trump will use tariffs as leverage with China, probably starting from the premise that China had not fulfilled its commitments under the
trade deal reached at the end of his first term
The Trump administration seems certain to impose new tariffs on China and very likely also on other countries that have significant trade
surpluses with the United States, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.Beijing will retaliate in some way since it will not want to
This is a political crisis, as well, because it stems from doubts among many in the Chinese business and intellectual elite, as well as its
middle class, about the direction that Xi has taken the country
compact, according to which Chinese were given more space to pursue economic and other activities, as long as they did not openly defy the
party.Coupled with a new Trump trade war, the resulting economic slowdown could create a vicious circle
Across China, local governments have incurred massive debt underwritten by a real estate bubble that has now burst
The collapse of the real estate sector has eroded consumer confidence, making it difficult to boost domestic demand
As a consequence, Beijing has relied on state-directed investment to drive growth, causing overcapacity in key export sectors: Chinese
companies are flooding markets with cheap electric vehicles and batteries, increasing trade tensions with the West and raising the prospect
of more tariffs and geopolitical tensions
By exporting its overcapacity, China also increases the likelihood that the United States and other countries will impose tough tariff
regimes on it, thus further undermining consumer confidence and causing even greater reliance on state-directed investment and exports
If this cycle locks the Chinese economy into a long-term slowdown, how a frustrated Beijing chooses to react will have security as well as
return.Mutual nuclear deterrence makes it highly improbable that friction between China and the United States will lead to military conflict
Amid these rising tensions, few Asian governments see relations with the United States or China as a binary choice: they will instead try to
Partnership was a shock to U.S
allies and friends that still reverberates across Asia
But the region quickly adapted after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe rallied TPP members to go ahead without Washington and transform the
trade pact into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
approach to Japan and other U.S
partners in East Asia during his first term.Today, however, the three most important U.S
The new Indonesian president, Prabowo Subianto, wants to take Indonesian foreign policy in a more activist direction, but he has yet to
establish himself regionally or internationally
When Prabowo visited the United States in November after the election, he spoke with Trump by telephone
Trump responded positively to this display of deference, but no meeting occurred
The region clearly needs someone to step forward and lead as the late Abe did, but there is no obvious candidate.America was always
Large, continent-sized countries such as the United States tend to look inward more than outward
foreign policy since George Washington warned against permanent alliances in his 1796 Farewell Address
Before World War II, the United States engaged in external affairs only episodically, and none of those episodes lasted very long
It took a direct attack on American soil at Pearl Harbor in 1941 to force Washington to confront the threats posed by fascism in Europe and
militarism in Japan; after World War II, the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union led the United States into the Cold War
The 50 years between 1941 and 1991, when the Soviet Union imploded, was the longest period of sustained external engagement in U.S
history.Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, the United States has not faced such an existential threat
So why should Americans, in the famous formulation of President John F
Indeed, with the Nixon Doctrine, U.S
policy toward much of Asia had already reverted to a less interventionist stance even during the later decades of the Cold War.Rather than
hankering after the imagined common values of a bygone age, then, U.S
Emulating their Asian counterparts, Western countries should learn to deal with Washington not as a superpower with almost unlimited
willingness to defend them but as an offshore balancer that will use its forces discriminatingly to advance American interests
first.(Source: Foreign Affairs)
